Moving the climate change regime further through a hydrogen protocol by Sindico, F. & Gupta, J.
 © Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
 
RECIEL 13 (2) 2004. ISSN 0962 8797
 
175
 
Moving the Climate Change Regime 
Further Through a Hydrogen Protocol
 
Francesco Sindico and Joyeeta Gupta
 
INTRODUCTION
 
The climate change regime is in the doldrums since
key parties have not yet ratiﬁed the Kyoto Protocol. It
is a unique regime in that it took only 2 years to
negotiate a framework convention on climate change,
 
1
 
which, in turn, entered into force within another 2 years.
Given the ‘wicked’ nature of the problem, i.e. the asym-
metrical distribution of costs and beneﬁts, it was all the
more remarkable that 186 countries eventually ratiﬁed
the agreement and supported the global framework for
dealing with the problem. In 1997, the world was agree-
ably surprised by the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol,
 
2
 
which included binding quantitative commitments for
developed countries.
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 However, when in 2001, the US
Government decided that it would not ratify the Protocol,
entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol hinged very much
on whether Russia would ratify the agreement or not.
Although in May 2004 the Russian Government has
announced that it will now speedily move towards
ratiﬁcation of the Protocol, the problem remains that
one of the largest emitters of greenhouse gases remains
outside the regime.
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 This implies that even if the Proto-
col enters into force in the near future, the incentive to
take far-reaching steps is somewhat diminished by the
non-participation of the US.
The question that then arises is what other alternative
paths can be explored that build on the existing
momentum and also try to draw on areas that interest
the more reluctant developed country parties. Hence,
this article explores the question whether the new sci-
entiﬁc interest in promoting the hydrogen economy
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as an alternative to the fossil fuel based economy pro-
vides a new framework for uniting countries within
the climate change regime. This argument is sup-
ported by the fact that, although climate change is
seen as a politically contentious issue, energy policy,
as a priority subject in most countries of the world, is
seen as less politically charged, and there are already a
number of political and legal frameworks and plat-
forms within which energy research and policy are
being developed. 
This article ﬁrst brieﬂy presents why energy is relevant
to climate change and why it is a priority issue in
many countries. The next section shows how energy
issues have been prioritized in the context of environ-
ment and development discussions in the last decade
or two, and the criteria developed from an environ-
mental perspective on sustainable energy sources. The
following section analyses the legal activities that
States have undertaken in relation to the promotion of
hydrogen as an alternative fuel. It highlights, in some
detail, the efforts of States within the International
Energy Agency (IEA), where hydrogen has been dealt
with since 1977. It discusses the new US-initiated
bilateral agreements on climate change and hydrogen,
and, ﬁnally, it presents the efforts of some States to
advance a hydrogen economy via the International
Partnership for a Hydrogen Economy. The next sec-
tion then returns to a discussion of whether a Hydro-
gen Protocol could end the current deadlock within
the climate change regime before drawing some ﬁnal
conclusions in the last section of this article.
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 The Kyoto Protocol enters into force only after 55 countries emitting
55% of the emissions of Annex I (developed) countries ratify the agree-
ment (Kyoto Protocol, Article 25(1)). As of May 2004, it is vital that
either Russia or the USA ratify the agreement for it to enter into force.
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 A hydrogen economy is a system in which energy needs, particu-
larly the transportation and housing sectors, are provided primarily
by hydrogen. Hydrogen has the advantage that it allows for efficient
 
storage of  energy over time. Thus, it is possible to imagine a future
scenario, which can be called the ‘hydrogen dream’, in which the
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‘back to the grid’ for use by other consumers. For more information on
the hydrogen economy, see J.O.M. Bockris, ‘The Origin of  Ideas on a
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CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
ENERGY: ENERGY IS A 
PRIORITY ISSUE FOR MOST 
COUNTRIES
 
This section makes two points. The ﬁrst is that policies in
the energy sector have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the prob-
lem of climate change. Second, energy policy is a priority
for all countries in the world and, unlike climate change,
countries have much stronger converging interests here. 
The energy sector is the most important sector con-
tributing to the emissions of greenhouse gases today.
Energy is also a fundamental aspect of the life we enjoy
today, and closely linked to the economic growth of
countries. While future energy needs will increase even
more, current energy trends are not environmentally
friendly: in fact, production, consumption and distribu-
tion of energy alone are responsible for more than half
of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions. Nevertheless,
the problems are not only environmental. In fact, it is
assumed that the sources of energy that we depend on will
end by the turn of this century. Ofﬁcial IEA statistics show
that more than half of the world’s energy production
(59%) comes from oil and coal. Only 11% comes from
renewable energies, while other relevant energy sources
are natural gas (21%), nuclear (7%) and hydro (2%).
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It is not surprising then that the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
emphasizes the central role of energy in causing and,
hence, addressing the problem of climate change. The
treaty speciﬁes the need for low greenhouse gas emit-
ting energy technologies, the need to promote research
and development in such energy sources, and emphasizes
the need for technology cooperation between countries.
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However, it does not speciﬁcally mention hydrogen as
an alternative approach. In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol to
the UNFCCC was negotiated and focused on enhancing
energy efﬁciency,
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 and on new and renewable forms of
energy.
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 The Kyoto Protocol calls on countries to cooper-
ate in the promotion of effective modalities for promot-
ing, ﬁnancing, developing, transferring environmentally
sound technologies, know-how, practices and processes
pertinent to climate change.
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 The Marrakech Accords,
negotiated in 2001,
 
11 
 
 elaborate on a number of rules for
undertaking technology transfer and capacity building,
but do not enter into a discussion of which energy sources
should be speciﬁcally promoted. From the climate change
discussions, what is clear is that there is need for new and
renewable energies with low greenhouse gas emissions.
The second point that needs to be emphasized is that
energy policy is a top priority in almost all countries.
This is because energy production and consumption is
closely related to the national income of countries, and
developing countries have based their arguments in the
climate change regime on their right to grow, which
would inevitably mean a rise in their emissions.
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 The
UNFCCC accepts this point in its Preamble.
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 Many
countries sit, therefore, in a critical dilemma. Large
developing countries, like China and India, face the
problem that if they wish to develop nuclear, large
hydro or fossil power projects, they run into tremendous
criticism because all these have negative side effects
and because there is a strong coalition of forces,
national and international, opposing the development
of some or all of these forms of energy generation.
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For those countries that have large fossil fuel reserves,
shifting to other sources, either unilaterally or because
of changing global demand, immediately implies a tre-
mendous loss of income, a point that has been effectively
made by the oil exporters and taken into account in
the UNFCCC.
 
15 
 
 For the large developed countries like
the USA, the fossil fuel lobby is very powerful and there
are major fears that prematurely shifting to other
energy sources will cost the economy considerably.
 
16
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(IEA, 2003), available at <http://
www.iea.org/statist/key2003.pdf>.
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UNFCCC, n. 1 above, Article 4(1)(c). 
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 Kyoto Protocol, n. 2 above, Article 2(1)(a)(i): ‘Enhancement of
energy efficiency in relevant sectors of  the national economy’.
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 Ibid., Article 2(1)(a)(iv): ‘Promotion, research, development and
increased use of  new and renewable forms of  energy, of  carbon
dioxide sequestration technologies and of  advanced and innovative
environmentally sound technologies’.
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 Ibid., Article 10(c). 
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 See 
 
Report of  the Conference of  the Parties on its Seventh Ses-
sion
 
 (FCCC/CP/2001/13, 21 January 2002).
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 See J. Gupta, 
 
The Climate Change Convention and Developing
Countries – From Conflict to Consensus?
 
 (Kluwer Academic Pub-
lishers, 1997), at 256, and J. Gupta, 
 
Our Simmering Planet: What to
do About Global Warming 
 
(Zed Publishers, 2001), at 178.
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K. Blok, M. Hisschemoller, C. Boudri and K. Dorland, 
 
An Asian
Dilemma: Modernising the Electricity Sector in China and India in
the context of  Rapid Economic Growth and the Concern for Climate
Change
 
 (Netherlands Research Programme on Climate Change
(NOP), National Institute of  Public Health and the Environment,
Bilthoven, NOP Report No 410200097, 2002).
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 UNFCCC, n. 1 above, Article 4(10). 
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 See, for example, the Byrd-Hagel Resolution (US Senate Resolution 98)
of 12 June 1997, which stated: ‘Whereas the Senate strongly believes
that the proposals under negotiation, because of  the disparity of
treatment between Annex I Parties and Developing Countries and
the level of  required emission reductions, could result in serious harm
to the United States economy, including significant job loss, trade
and disadvantages, increased energy and consumer costs, or any
combination thereof; . . .’. The US Senate adopted this resolution in
July 1997. Subsequently, in October 1997, Senator Hagel made a speech
to Congress stating, among other things: ‘Many of my colleagues and
I fear the current treaty negotiations will shackle the United States’
economy – meaning fewer jobs, lower economic growth and a lower
standard of living for our children and our future generations. This treaty
would do so without any meaningful reduction in greenhouse gases
because – because – it leaves out the very nations who will be the world’s
largest emitters of  greenhouse gases, the more than 130 developing
nations including China, India, Mexico, South Korea, and many others’;
source: Congressional Record (3 October 1997) (Senate), at S10308–
S10311, available at <http://www.microtech.com.au/daly/hagel.htm>.
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Thus, energy policy is vital for countries. One of the
critical reasons why the climate change regime is in a
state of deadlock is also because, on the assumption
that shifting to other energy sources is expensive and
hence not viable, this implies that any effective solu-
tion to the climate change problem inevitably calls for
reducing emissions and that these emissions need to be
subsequently shared between countries. The sharing
of these emissions is a politically sensitive issue because
of the implications for economic growth. On the other
hand, if a promising alternative energy source can be
developed in a cost-effective manner, and if new
actors can rally behind this new source, the whole
issue of sharing emission rights can be bypassed, and
the need to question the science of climate change
becomes less urgent.
There is, therefore, an urgent need from the climate
change perspective to switch to more sustainable
sources of energy, and to more responsible consump-
tion and distribution patterns. This is so also because
energy investments are long-term investments and if
States do not invest in new or renewable options this
might cause a technology lock-in on old and unsus-
tainable energy sources.
 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
AND ENERGY
 
This section moves to the following issue: what criteria
or advice do other environmental and developmental
agreements specify in relation to energy issues? Inter-
national documents of the last 15 years have emphasized
the need for sustainable energy. In 1987, when the
World Commission on Environment and Development
explored the environmental and economic challenges
facing the world, it saw the climate change problem as
extremely serious, but did not explicitly mention the
hydrogen economy as a potential alternative to the fossil-
fuel economy.
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 The Commission, however, did emphasize
that all available energy forms had their advantages
and disadvantages and that ‘choice[s] must be made,
but in the certain knowledge that choosing an energy
strategy inevitably means choosing an environmental
strategy’.
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The document included an annex with a
list of important legal principles, and these principles
emphasize that, 
 
inter alia
 
, energy strategies need to be
based on the precautionary principle, environmental
impact assessments and strict liability.
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In 1992, the United Nations Conference on Environ-
ment and Development (UNCED) adopted Agenda 21,
a programme of action that deals with a broad range
of issues.
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 Chapter 9 deals with the protection of the
atmosphere and energy-related issues. This chapter,
 
inter alia
 
, points out, ﬁrst, that States agree that cur-
rent energy production, distribution and consumption
patterns are unsustainable.
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 Second, energy-related
issues must be dealt with by all stakeholders, which
implies the participation of States, UN bodies,
 
22 
 
 non-
government organizations, intergovernmental organ-
izations and private parties.
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 The role of business and
of civil society in the energy sector must be underlined
because it marks a trend that will probably continue
in the following years. Third, the Agenda focuses on
the importance of the promotion and development of
renewable energies as one of the ways to reduce negat-
ive effects on the atmosphere coming from the energy
sector.
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 Fourth, States are encouraged to use eco-
nomic measures to promote clean energies but these
must take the environmental and social priorities
of the country concerned into account.
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Finally,
Agenda 21 stresses that developing country needs in
the implementation of a global energy strategy need
to be considered.
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 The Rio Declaration adopted at
UNCED also speciﬁes that countries need to take
precautionary measures,
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undertake environmental
impact assessments
 
28 
 
 and are liable for harm caused.
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In 2001, the United Nations Commission on Sustain-
able Development (UNCSD) dealt with energy-related
issues during its ninth session.
 
30 
 
 Its ﬁnal report
included a decision entitled ‘Energy for Sustainable
Development’,
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 which speciﬁes that ‘current patterns
of energy production, distribution and utilization are
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 World Commission on Environment and Development, 
 
Our Com-
mon Future
 
 (Oxford University Press, 1987).
 
18
 
 Ibid., at 2.
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 Ibid., Annex 1, at 348–351.
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 Agenda 21 (A/Conf.151/26, 1991) is important because it links,
for the first time, economic, environmental, poverty and development
issues stressing the need to integrate environment and development.
For more information on Agenda 21, see P. Birnie and A. Boyle,
 
International Law and the Environment
 
, 2nd edn
 
 
 
(Oxford University
Press, 2002), at 43 and D. Hunter, J. Salzman and D. Zaelke, 
 
Interna-
tional Environmental Law and Policy
 
, 2nd edn (Foundation Press,
2002), at 202–204. 
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 Agenda 21, para. 9.9.
 
22
 
 The importance of  the UN system and of  multilateralism as a
framework in which to discuss energy-related issues is underlined
in Agenda 21. This position is stressed by T. Maraun, ‘A Global
Energy Strategy as a Viable Means for Redressing Climate
Change’, 63:2 
 
Heidelberg Journal of  International Law 
 
(2003), 281,
at 285. 
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 Agenda 21
 
,
 
 n. 20 above, para.
 
 
 
9.12.
 
24
 
 Ibid., para.
 
 
 
9.12(d).
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 Ibid., para. 9.12(h).
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 Ibid., paras 9.11 and
 
 
 
9.12(a), (b), (c), (d), (e).
 
27
 
 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (A/CONF.151/
26 (Vol. 1), 12 August 1992), Principle 15.
 
28
 
 Ibid., Principle 17.
 
29
 
 Ibid., Principle 13.
 
30
 
 For more information on the UNCSD ninth session, see the
website available at <http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/csd/CSD9.htm>.
See also T. Maraun, n. 22 above, at 286.
 
31
 
 
 
UNCSD Report on the Ninth Session
 
 (E/CN.17/2001/19, 5 May
2000 and 16–27 April 2001), Decision 9/1, ‘Energy for Sustainable
Development’. 
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unsustainable’,
 
32 
 
 thereby repeating what Agenda 21
had maintained almost 10 years before. The report
lists future key energy issues,
 
33 
 
 such as accessibility of
energies,
 
34 
 
 energy efﬁciency,
 
35 
 
 renewable energies,
 
36
 
and energy and transport.
 
37 
 
 Sustainable energy is
deﬁned as reliable, affordable, economically viable,
socially acceptable and environmentally sound energy.
 
38 
 
The UNCSD report fosters multilateralism
 
39 
 
 and a
multi-stakeholder approach.
 
40 
 
 Speciﬁc importance is
given to providing a regulatory framework that
provides incentives for private sector participation
 
41
 
within well-functioning markets.
 
42 
 
 It says that ﬁnan-
cial help, technology transfer and capacity building
should be made available to developing countries to
facilitate their participation in the development and
use of modern environmentally friendly technolo-
gies.
 
43 
 
 Finally, the international community strongly
maintains the importance of the promotion of renew-
able energies.
 
44 
 
Similar views were echoed at the 2002 World Summit
on Sustainable Development (WSSD), although the
issue was not further articulated. The Johannesburg
Declaration on Sustainable Development speciﬁes the
global community’s commitment ‘to a humane, equit-
able and caring global society,
 
45 
 
 . . . free of indignity
and indecency occasioned by poverty, environmental
degradation and patterns of unsustainable develop-
ment’.
 
46 
 
 The Declaration recalls the previous agree-
ments and then concludes that the only way forward is
multilateralism. The Plan of Implementation of the
WSSD does not discuss the issue of energy in a speciﬁc
chapter, nor does it mention hydrogen. However,
many chapters refer to energy-related issues, and the
need for affordable and environmentally sustainable
energy.
 
47 
 
The above brief history reveals that from a sustain-
able development perspective, there is considerable
emphasis paid to the need to develop sustainable energy
within a multilateral and multi-stakeholder framework,
based on the precautionary principle, the environmental
impacts principle and the liability principle.
 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
AND THE HYDROGEN 
ECONOMY
 
Deciding new or alternative energy policies implies
risks and many costs at the beginning. As mentioned
earlier, both for developed countries and even more
for developing countries, ‘choosing an energy strategy
inevitably means choosing an environmental strat-
egy’.
 
48 
 
 One of the most interesting options for States
currently is to develop hydrogen as an energy carrier.
Especially in the motor vehicle sector, this could be
very important because hydrogen-powered vehicles
would emit only water vapour instead of carbon diox-
ide. Not everybody, though, agrees completely on the
beneﬁts of hydrogen. While some scientists insist that
hydrogen will be able to deal with major environmental
concerns, starting with climate change,
 
49 
 
 others are
more reluctant to support this new energy option.
 
50
 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that scientists agree
that hydrogen is an optimal solution if it is produced
mainly from renewable energy sources.
While the global energy discussions have focused on
alternative sources of energy in general, it is becoming
apparent that speciﬁc discussions on hydrogen are
developing rapidly. The subsection below presents and
analyses the existing international agreements related
to hydrogen, namely within the IEA. It covers the
bilateral agreements that the USA has promoted with
various countries on the promotion of hydrogen
research and development, and the forthcoming Inter-
national Partnership for a Hydrogen Economy.
 
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY
 
The IEA was established in 1974 and is an autonom-
ous agency linked with the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD). There
are 26 member countries and its main goals are to
 
32
 
 Ibid., para. 2. 
 
33
 
 Ibid., para. 11. Other key energy issues are advanced fossil fuel
technologies (para. 18), nuclear energy technologies (para. 20) and
rural energy (para. 22). 
 
34
 
 Ibid., paras 12 and 13.
 
35
 
 Ibid., para. 14.
 
36
 
 Ibid., paras 16 and 17. 
 
37
 
 Ibid., para. 24. 
 
38
 
 Ibid., para. 3.
 
39
 
 Ibid., paras 5, 10(i), 13(a), 17(a), 35 and 36.
 
40
 
 Ibid., para. 32.
 
41
 
 Ibid., paras 3, 10(k), 13(g) and 13(c).
 
42
 
 Ibid., para. 31.
 
43
 
 Ibid., paras 7, 8, 13(i), 17(i) and 36(c). 
 
44
 
 Ibid., paras 13(d), 13(h), 16 and 17.
 
45
 
 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development (A/
CONF.199/20, 4 September 2002), para. 2. 
 
46
 
 Ibid., para. 3.
 
47
 
 See, for example, ibid., chapter 2, para. 9(a), chapter 3, paras 20–
21, chapter 8, para. 62 and chapter 9, paras 73–76.
 
48
 
 See World Commission on Environment and Development, n. 17
above, at 168.
 
49
 
 See M.J. Prather, ‘An Environmental Experiment with H
 
2
 
’,
302:5645 
 
Science
 
 (2003), 81 and M.G. Schultz 
 
et al.
 
, ‘Air Pollution
and Climate-Forcing Impacts of  a Global Hydrogen Economy’,
302:5645 
 
Science
 
 (2003), 624, at 625.
 
50
 
 T.K. Tromp 
 
et al.
 
, ‘Potential Environmental Impact of  a Hydrogen
Economy on the Stratosphere’, 300:5626 
 
Science
 
 (2003), 1740 focus
primarily on the increase of  hydrogen in the atmosphere that would
moisten the stratosphere and would lead to a negative cooling of
the lower stratosphere and to a disturbance of  the ozone chemistry.
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share energy information, to coordinate energy pol-
icies and to cooperate in the development of rational
energy programmes.
 
51 
 
 The IEA works by facilitating
international cooperation through programmes that
are called ‘Implementing Agreements’. Within this
framework, the organization has dealt with hydrogen
since 1977 when the IEA Implementing Agreement
for a Programme of Research and Development on
the Production and Utilization of Hydrogen (IEA
Hydrogen Agreement) was signed.
 
52 
 
 Before analysing
the latter, it is useful to make some remarks on the
legal framework of the Implementing Agreements as
a whole. 
 
IEA Framework for International Energy
Technology Cooperation 
 
In 2002, the IEA
undertook a thorough review of the legal basis of the
different programmes established within its mandate.
This led to the IEA Framework for International Energy
Technology Cooperation (IEA Framework).
 
53 
 
 According
to this document, an Implementing Agreement is:
 
a contractual relationship established by at least two IEA
Member countries, and approved by the Governing Board,
. . . to enable IEA Member countries to carry out program-
mes and projects on energy technology research, develop-
ment and deployment.
 
54 
Participants in Implementing Agreements are divided
into two categories: contracting parties55  and sponsors.56
By analysing Article 3(2)(4)57  and 3(3)(4)58  of the IEA
Framework, it could be argued that some participants
in an Implementing Agreement enjoy more rights than
others. Sponsors, for example, are not allowed to be
designated chair or vice chair of an executive com-
mittee and OECD country based entities seem to have
more rights than non-OECD country based entities. 
The institutional structure of an Implementing Agree-
ment provides for an executive committee constituted
of representatives of all participants.59  This body is
in charge of the main activity of the Implementing
Agreement, which is the promotion of research and
development of a speciﬁc energy-related issue. It
approves the annual programme and budget, and
must annually submit a report to the IEA. 
In sum, an Implementing Agreement is a binding legal
agreement that brings together all stakeholders inter-
ested in promoting the research and development of
speciﬁc energy sectors.60  What is important to under-
line is the nature of this agreement; in fact, Article 7
maintains that it is ‘binding on all participants’. 
IEA Implementing Agreement for a Pro-
gramme of Research and Development on
the Production and Utilization of Hydrogen61
The IEA Framework is also relevant to the speciﬁc IEA
Hydrogen Agreement,62  as underlined in Article 10(c)
of the latter.63  The scope of this agreement is clearly
outlined in Article 1(a), which reads as follows:
The Programme to be carried out by the Contracting Parties
within the framework of this Agreement shall consist of
cooperative research, development, demonstrations and
exchanges of information regarding the production and
utilization of hydrogen.64  (emphasis added)
Therefore, the main goal of this agreement is the pro-
motion of hydrogen research and development. Since
the IEA did not consider it feasible to deal with all
hydrogen-related issues at once, it identiﬁed speciﬁc
tasks65  that were included in annexes to the agreement,66
51 For more information on the IEA, see the website available at
<http://www.iea.org>.
52 IEA Implementing Agreement for a Programme of  Research and
Development on the Production and Utilization of  Hydrogen (Paris,
6 October 1977) (IEA Hydrogen Agreement). It was amended on
1 May 1995 and recently it was modified in order to take into
account the Implementing Agreements’ legal framework set up in
the IEA Framework for International Energy Technology Coopera-
tion. The last version of  the IEA Hydrogen Agreement document is
not a public document and cannot be found on the Internet.
53 IEA Framework for International Energy Technology Cooperation
(IEA/GB(2003)6/REV2/ANN1, 3 April 2003).
54 Ibid., Article 1.
55 Ibid., Article 3(2). 
56 Ibid., Article 3(3). 
57 Ibid., Article 3(2)(4). 
58 Ibid., Article 3(3)(4). 
59 Ibid., Article 1(4).
60 Ibid., Article 7.
61 IEA Hydrogen Agreement, n. 52 above. 
62 IEA Implementing Agreement for a Programme of  Research and
Development on the Production and Utilization of  Hydrogen (as
amended on 1 May 1995) (IEA Implementing Agreement). For
more information on the agreement as to 1999, see C.C. Elam
(ed.), IEA Agreement on the Production and Utilization of  Hydrogen,
1999 Annual Report (Doc. IEA/H2/AR-99, 1999), available at
<http://www.eere.energy.gov/hydrogenandfue cells/hydrogen/iea/pdfs/
1999_annual_report.pdf>.
63 In fact, Article 10(c) establishes that the participants must take
into account the Guiding Principles for Cooperation in the Field of
Energy Research and Development (Doc. IEA/GB(91)79, 9 Decem-
ber 1991) and any modification thereof, such as the IEA Framework. 
64 Emphasis added by authors.
65 Current and completed annexes of  the IEA Hydrogen Implement-
ing Agreement are Annex 1, Thermochemical Production (1977–
1988); Annex 2, High Temperature Reactors (1977–1979); Annex 3,
Assessment of  Potential Future Markets (1977–1980); Annex 4,
Electrolytic Production (1979–1988); Annex 5, Solid Oxide Water
Electrolysis (1979–1983); Annex 6, Photocatalytic Water Electro-
lysis (1979–1988); Annex 7, Storage, Conversion and Safety (1983–
1992); Annex 8, Technical and Economic Assessment of  Hydrogen
(1986–1990); Annex 9, Hydrogen Production (1988–1993); Annex
10, Photoproduction of  Hydrogen (1995–1998); Annex 11, Integ-
rated Systems (1995–1998); Annex 12, Metal Hybrids for Hydrogen
Storage (1995–ongoing); Annex 13, Design and Optimization of
Integrated Systems (1999–ongoing); Annex 14, Photoelectrolytic
Production of  Hydrogen (1999–ongoing); Annex 15, Photobiological
Production of  Hydrogen (1999–ongoing). 
66 IEA Hydrogen Agreement, n. 52 above, Article 1(b).
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which are binding only upon the participants therein.67
The parties are free, once they enter into the agree-
ment, to engage in the tasks that they are interested in
and new tasks can be established following a speciﬁc
procedure.68  The parties agree to disseminate publicly
the results of the hydrogen research undertaken in the
different tasks; nevertheless, these results will be pro-
tected by intellectual property rights.69 
Participants in the agreement can be divided into
three categories: contracting parties; associate con-
tracting parties; and sponsors. Contracting parties can
be governments or government-designated entities
coming from either IEA Member States or from OECD
Member States that are not part of the IEA.70  Their
main obligation is to carry out and implement the
programme.71  They will have to incur any cost involved
in implementation72  and they must foster the widest
possible dissemination of the results.73  Contracting
parties also enjoy several rights such as the right to
designate one member of the Executive Committee,74
jointly appoint an operating agent for each task in
which they are involved75  and to appoint the arbit-
rators of the tribunal, which decides on disputes that
may arise between parties.76  Associate contracting
parties come from non-OECD countries and can also
be governments or government-designated entities.77
Rights and obligations of associate contracting parties
are similar to the ones that contracting parties enjoy,
and will be speciﬁed in an agreement between the
Executive Committee, acting by unanimity of the con-
tracting parties, and the associate contracting party
itself.78  Finally, and only in exceptional cases, spon-
sors can be invited to adopt the IEA Hydrogen Agree-
ment. Sponsors will be either OECD-based entities,
who have not been designated by their respective gov-
ernments, or non-government international organiza-
tions in which OECD-based entities participate.79  In
this case, the rights and obligations of the sponsors
will be decided by the Committee on Energy Research
and Technology of the IEA on the basis of a proposal
from the Executive Committee.80  The sponsor’s discip-
line in the IEA Hydrogen Agreement differs from the
IEA Framework because it is not stated clearly that
non-OECD-based entities may be admitted as sponsors. 
In sum, participants to the IEA Hydrogen Agreement
can be governments, national agencies, public organ-
izations, private corporations, companies or other
entities designated by such governments. Currently,
member countries of the agreement are Canada, the
European Community, Japan, Hungary (observer),
Iceland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and USA. 
The institutional structure of the IEA Hydrogen
Agreement constitutes an Executive Committee, the
Secretary and Operating Agents. The Executive
Committee is in charge of the management of the
agreement81  and every contracting party is entitled to
appoint one member of the Committee.82  In order to
fulﬁl the IEA Hydrogen Agreement’s goals, the Execut-
ive Committee has the power to take decisions83  and
make rules and regulations84  that will be binding on
the contracting parties and the Operating Agents.85
The agreement also covers other ﬁnancial, technical
and administrative aspects of the Executive Commit-
tee’s work.86  
The rest of the IEA Hydrogen Agreement’s institu-
tional structure is completed by the Secretary87  and by
the Operating Agents.88  The latter are designated for
each task and are responsible for their administration.
They submit an annual report to the Executive
Committee and to the IEA. 
The IEA Hydrogen Agreement provides for a response
against non-compliance and for a dispute-settling
system. In fact, on the one hand, if the Executive
Committee considers that a contracting party is not
fulﬁlling its obligations related to the agreement or to
a speciﬁc task it may, acting by unanimity, exclude
that contracting party from the agreement.89  On the
other hand, the dispute-settling system provided for
in the IEA Hydrogen Agreement maintains that, if
negotiations are not capable of resolving a dispute
that arises over the interpretation or the application
of any provision of the agreement, arbitration will be
arranged. If the parties do not agree on the members
of the tribunal, the President of the International
Court of Justice will form the tribunal and its decision
will be binding on the contracting parties.90 
67 Ibid., Article 2(c). 
68 Ibid., Article 2(b).
69 Ibid., Article 8.
70 Ibid., Article 11(a).
71 Ibid., Article 1(a) and (b).
72 Ibid., Article 7(a).
73 Ibid., Article 8(b).
74 Ibid., Article 3(b). 
75 Ibid., Article 5(a).
76 Ibid., Article 10(d).
77 Ibid., Article 11(b).
78 Ibid., Article 11(b). 
79 Ibid., Article 12.
80 Ibid., Article 12(1).
81 Ibid., Article 3(a) 
82 Ibid., Article 3(b).
83 Ibid., Article 3(a).
84 Ibid., Article 3(c)(2).
85 While it has the power to take legally binding decisions, it has
never used this option up to today.
86 See IEA Hydrogen Agreement, n. 52 above, Article 3(c)(1), (f )
and (e). 
87 Ibid., Article 4.
88 Ibid., Article 5.
89 Ibid., Article 11(f); according to this provision withdrawal from the
agreement or from a specific task can also be voluntary.
90 Ibid., Article10(c). 
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In conclusion, the IEA Hydrogen Agreement consti-
tutes a multilateral framework that brings together the
main stakeholders (national governments, interna-
tional organizations, civil society actors, private par-
ties) that believe in the need for promoting hydrogen
research and development. The agreement is not only
a political programmatic declaration but, since its
establishment in 1977, is meant to be a binding legal
agreement.91 
UNITED STATES BILATERAL 
AGREEMENTS
The IEA Hydrogen Agreement reﬂects broad political
support within IEA countries on the need to develop
hydrogen-related technology. In fact, since 2001, it
appears as if promoting hydrogen research and policy
internationally has also become an important part of
American foreign policy. Since the US Government’s
withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001,92  the USA
has signed 17 agreements with developed and devel-
oping countries on climate change issues,93  and has
signed three agreements with Brazil, the EU and Italy
focusing on the promotion of a hydrogen economy.94
The bilateral agreements on climate change are, in
general, quite vague but stress the need for stronger
collaboration in the efforts to tackle climate change;
identiﬁcation of sectors that will be covered by the
agreements; research and development; instruments
such as carbon sequestration; capacity building in
developing countries; the use of carbon sinks; the use
of market-based mechanisms; instruments that may
reduce CO2 emissions; and private party participation
in addressing the problem of climate change.
A study of the bilateral hydrogen agreements and
some of the climate change agreements that include
hydrogen (US agreements with Canada, India, the
Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Russia, China, Aus-
tralia, Mexico, South Africa and Japan)95  show that
the three main goals in the agreements analysed are to
enhance security of energy supply; to increase divers-
ity of energy sources; and to improve local and global
environmental quality.96 
The agreements concentrate on economic instruments
and legal instruments to achieve these goals. On the
91 The possibility for the Executive Committee to take binding deci-
sions in order to fulfil the agreement’s goals; the power to exclude
from the agreement or from a specific task a party which has not
complied with its obligations; and the establishment of  a dispute-
settling system demonstrate how developed the legal framework of
the IEA Hydrogen Agreement is.
92 See press statement of  the US State Department, Remarks by
President Bush on Global Climate Change (11 June 2001), avail-
able at <http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/rm/4149pf.htm>. 
93 According to the US State Department website on the US Global
Climate Change Policy <http://www.state.gov/g/oes/climate/>: ‘Since
June 2001, the United States has engaged in bilateral partnerships
with Australia, Canada, China, seven Central American countries
(Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua,
and Panama), the EU, India, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of
Korea, and the Russian Federation on issues ranging from climate
change science to energy and sequestration technologies to policy
approaches’; see US Department of  State Fact Sheet, Bureau of
Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs,
United States Global Climate Change Policy (27 February 2003),
available at <http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/fs/2003/18055pf.htm>.
94 Memorandum of  Understanding between the Department of
Energy of  the United States of  America and the Ministry of  Mines
and Energy of  the Federative Republic of  Brazil for the Establish-
ment of  a Mechanisms for Consultations on Energy Cooperation
(Washington DC, 20 June 2003) (USA–Brazil Memorandum), avail-
able at <http://www.eere.energy.gov/hydrogenandfuelcells/pdfs/
brazil_us_mou_statement.pdf>; Joint Statement by President
George W. Bush, European Council President Konstandinos Simitis,
and European Commission President Romano Prodi on the Hydrogen
Economy (Washington DC, 25 June 2003) (USA–EU Joint Statement),
available at <http://www.eurunion.org/partner/summit /Summit0306/
HydrogEconStatement.htm>; Joint Statement by Secretary Spencer
Abraham of  the United States of  America and Minister Antonio
Marzano of  the Republic of  Italy on Cooperation in Energy Techno-
logies (Rome, August 2003) (USA–Italy Joint Statement), avail-
able at <http://www.eere.energy.gov/hydrogenandfuelcells/pdfs/
italy_joint_statement.pdf>.
95 The following are the 13 agreements which have been analysed
in this section of  the article: USA–Brazil Memorandum, n. 94 above;
USA–EU Joint Statement, n. 94 above; USA–Italy Joint Statement,
n. 94 above; US Department of  State Press Statement, Climate
Coordination Announced Between the United States and Canada
(Washington DC, 7 March 2002) (USA–Canada Press Statement),
available at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/8678pf.htm>;
USA–India Joint Statement on Climate Change: Statement on the
Visit of  Mr Harlan Watson, US Climate Change Negotiator and
Special Representative (New Delhi, 6 May 2002) (USA–India Joint
Statement), available at <http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/prsrl/press/
jan/9964pf.htm>; USA–Republic of  Korea Joint Statement on
Enhanced Bilateral Climate Change Cooperation (Washington DC,
27 August 2002) (USA–Republic of  Korea Joint Statement), available
at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/13088.htm>. Joint State-
ment: New Zealand and the United States to Pursue Enhanced
Bilateral Climate Change Cooperation (Washington DC, 24 October
2002) (USA–New Zealand Joint Statement), available at <http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/14632pf.htm>; Joint Statement of
the USA–Russian Inter-Ministerial Climate Change Policy Dialogue
(Moscow, 17 January 2003) (USA–Russia Joint Statement), available
at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/16782pf.htm>; Joint State-
ment of  the USA–China Working Group on Climate Change (Beijing,
16 January 2003) (USA–China Joint Statement), available at <http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/16785pf.htm>; 2002–2003 Australia–
USA Climate Action Partnership (27 February 2002) (CAP) Activ-
ities (USA–Australia CAP), available at <http://www.state.gov/g/oes/
climate/rmks/11788pf.htm>; Joint Statement of  Enhanced Bilateral
Climate Change Cooperation Between the United States and Mexico
(Washington DC, 18 March 2003) (USA–Mexico Joint Statement),
available at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/18801pf.htm>;
United States–South Africa Joint Statement on Climate Change
(Pretoria, 28–29 July 2003) (USA–South Africa Joint Statement),
available at <http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/or/22912pf.htm>; Joint
Statement of  the United States and Japan High-Level Consultations
on Climate Change (Washington DC, 7 August 2003) (USA–Japan Joint
Statement), available at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/environment/
warm/cop/joint0308.html>.
96 See the USA–EU Joint Statement and the USA–Italy Joint State-
ment, n. 94 above. On this point the two instruments repeat practic-
ally the same wording.
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one hand, the agreements foster the development of
an economic scenario where private parties can par-
ticipate as fundamental actors in the promotion of
hydrogen thanks to market-based mechanisms97  that
would favour investments. Business is encouraged to
enter public–private partnerships and energy trade98
is considered to be an instrument to promote hydro-
gen use. On the other hand, this economic ﬁeld must
be based on solid legal foundations. The agreements
call for the establishment of codes, standards and
regulations that can make this economic scenario
work efﬁciently.99  
The study of the US hydrogen bilateral agreements
shows some possible ﬂaws. In the ﬁrst place, while
assistance to developing countries and capacity-
building issues are taken into account in most climate
change bilateral agreements,100  this does not happen
in the hydrogen bilateral agreements. In the second
place, the production of hydrogen from renewable
energies is not a crucial point. This is controversial
because there is consensus about the fact that hydro-
gen is an optimal solution to achieve sustainable
energy only if, especially from a long-term perspective,
its production derives mainly from these kinds of
energy sources.101  Instead of taking into account devel-
oping country needs and the importance of renewable
energies, the US hydrogen bilateral agreements seem
to be more interested in ﬁnding consumers for this
new technology.102 
But what is the legal nature of these bilateral agree-
ments? The lack of transparency related to these
documents does not help to determine their legal
nature. Nevertheless, they seem to be nothing more
than programmatic declarations. They constitute ele-
ments of State practice but do not create legally bind-
ing obligations between the parties to the agreements.
The US–Brazil Memorandum is the clearest on this
issue. It reads as follows:
The participants understand that these consultations are
not intended to create legally binding obligations between
them.103 
The bilateral agreements that the USA has signed pro-
moting a hydrogen economy are soft law instruments
that do not create binding legal obligations among the
parties. They set the foundations for a future multi-
lateral framework, the International Partnership for a
Hydrogen Economy (IPHE), which, according to the US
position, should help advance the hydrogen economy. 
INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIP 
FOR A HYDROGEN ECONOMY
The IPHE was launched at a meeting in Washington
that took place from 18 to 21 November 2003, where
ministers from 15 countries104  dealt with the creation
of an organization focusing on the development of
a hydrogen economy.105  Delegations committed
themselves106  to sign terms of reference for the IPHE
(Terms of Reference),107  and agreed that these will be
the charter of the new partnership. 
The IPHE is being built upon the conviction that
hydrogen can improve the local and global energy
supplies, and economic and environmental security.
The IPHE has two main goals. On the one hand, as
Article 1 of the Terms of Reference states, the ﬁrst
purpose is:
To serve as a mechanism to organize and implement effect-
ive, efﬁcient, and focused international research, develop-
ment, demonstration and commercial utilization activities
related to hydrogen energy technologies. (emphasis added)
97 On the importance of  the private parties and market-based mech-
anisms see the USA–Italy Joint Statement, ibid.; USA–EU Joint
Statement, n. 94 above; USA–Japan Joint Statement, n. 95 above; USA–
Australia CAP; and the USA–Canada Press Statement, n. 95 above. 
98 Investments and energy trade are cited explicitly in para. 1 of  the
USA–Brazil Memorandum, n. 94 above. 
99 See USA–EU Joint Statement and USA–Italy Joint Statement.
See n. 94 above. 
100 Developing country needs are considered, for example, in the
USA–Japan Joint Statement; USA–Australia CAP; USA–Canada
Press Statement; and in the USA–New Zealand Joint Statement,
n. 95 above. 
101 Only the USA–EU Joint Statement underlines clearly this link
by saying: ‘In this context we see the potential of  the hydrogen
economy in establishing a secure energy supply through clean and
environmentally sound systems’. US bilateral climate change
agreements focus more specifically on the promotion of  renewable
energies: see the USA–Japan Joint Statement; USA–Canada Press
Statement; USA–India Joint Statement; USA–South Africa Joint State-
ment; and the USA–Republic of  Korea Joint Statement, n. 95 above.
102 See the USA–EU Joint Statement, n. 94 above, which states:
‘Our cooperation will lay the technical, legal, and commercial basis
needed to accelerate the commercial penetration and trade of
emissions-free hydrogen technology worldwide, in cars, buildings
and power generation, . . .’. This trend in the US policy is stressed
also in the goal of  the IPHE: ‘The ultimate goal of  the IPHE will be
to enable Partner countries’ consumers to have by 2020 the prac-
tical option of  purchasing a competitively priced hydrogen powered
vehicle that can be refuelled conveniently’.
103 USA–Brazil Memorandum, n. 94 above, para. 3. 
104 The countries and regional organizations that have sent a
delegation to the IPHE Ministerial Meeting in Washington are Aus-
tralia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Iceland, India, Italy,
Japan, Republic of  Korea, Russia, the UK, the USA and the Euro-
pean Community. 
105 Information about the meeting is available at <http://www.
usea.org/iphe.htm>. 
106 This is what is pointed out at the beginning of  the Non-Paper on
Activities and Operations of  the IPHE Committees (31 October
2003). This document is available at <http://www.usea.org/
Concept%20Paper%20for%20Committees.pdf>. 
107 The Revised Draft of  the Terms of  Reference for the IPHE
(31 October 2003) is available at <http://www.usea.org/
Revised%20Terms%20of%20Reference.pdf>. The analysis of  the
IPHE present in this article is based on the study of  this document. 
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On the other hand, Article 1 underlines the second
purpose, which is to provide:
. . . a forum for advancing policies, and international codes
and standards that can accelerate the cost-effective transi-
tion to a global hydrogen economy. (emphasis added)
Therefore, the IPHE’s overall goal is to foster a cost-
effective transition to a hydrogen economy.108 
How does the IPHE intend to achieve this goal? The
Terms of Reference point out the need to identify
areas in which research and development are most
urgent and, hence, where bilateral and multilateral
cooperation should focus. Second, the Terms of Refer-
ence stress the need for large-scale, long-term public–
private cooperation109  and for uniform international
codes and standards.110  The importance of private
parties and market-based instruments is not clearly
outlined, but can be read between the lines of Article 2
of the Terms of Reference. 
But achieving a hydrogen economy is not only about
promoting research and establishing public–private
collaborations. There are many other issues at stake.
There is a whole range of technical, ﬁnancial, legal,
market, socioeconomic, environmental, and policy
issues that must be taken into account. The IPHE is
aware of these issues and it maintains that it will
address those that have not been dealt with else-
where.111  The IPHE acknowledges the IEA’s work,
considering it to be complementary to the promotion
of a hydrogen economy.112  
The Terms of Reference establish an institutional
structure that includes a Planning Committee, an
Implementing Committee, a Liaison Committee and
Secretariat.113  The Planning Committee will provide
direction, governance and management for the IPHE.
It will focus mainly on the second IPHE goal, by
developing policies, plans and strategies to advance
a hydrogen economy, and by working on uniform
international codes and standards.114  The Implementa-
tion Committee will assist the Planning Committee
and will focus mainly on the ﬁrst IPHE goal of organ-
izing and implementing research, development,
demonstration and commercial utilization activities
related to hydrogen energy technologies.115  One of its
ﬁrst tasks will be to identify three topics on which to
focus international research and development. The
Liaison Committee116  will be in charge of keeping rela-
tions with international stakeholders interested in
hydrogen research and development from non-IPHE
partners.117  Finally, the Secretariat will coordinate the
Committee’s activities and will focus on administrative
issues.118 
The Terms of Reference maintain that research and
development results should be open and non-proprietary;
nevertheless, it also says that intellectual property
rights that may arise from the research and development
undertaken will be deﬁned in future arrangements.119 
Article 4(1) of the Terms of Reference states the legal
nature of the Partnership:
These Terms of Reference, which are administrative in
nature, do not create any legally binding obligations be-
tween or among its Partners. Each Partner will conduct the
activities contemplated by these Terms of Reference in
accordance with the laws under which it operates and the
international instruments to which it is a party. (emphasis
added)
In conclusion, the IPHE is not a binding legal agree-
ment. It does not establish legal obligations among
its parties. The partners only commit themselves to
participate together in the promotion of a hydrogen
economy.120 
108 The ultimate goal of  the partnership has been defined very pre-
cisely in the introduction to the Terms of  Reference: ‘The ultimate
goal of  the IPHE will be to enable Partner countries’ consumers to
have by 2020 the practical option of  purchasing a competitively
priced hydrogen powered vehicle that can be refuelled conven-
iently’; see Terms of  Reference, ibid.
109 Ibid., Article 2(4).
110 Ibid., Article 2(3).
111 Ibid., Article 2(6). 
112 The relationship between the IPHE and the IEA is clearly out-
lined in Article 3(10) of  the Terms of  Reference: ‘The IPHE will co-
ordinate its activities with the International Energy Agency, the
hydrogen efforts of  which are an important complement to the IPHE
and which the IPHE views as a valuable institution in the transition
to the hydrogen economy’; ibid.
113 For more information on the institutional structure of  the IPHE
see Non-Paper on Activities and Operations of  the IPHE Commit-
tees, n. 106 above.
114 According to the Terms of  Reference, Article 3(5), the Planning
Committee will meet at least once a year and decisions will be
taken by consensus. It will, according to ibid., Article 4(2), decide by
consensus about inviting new partners to join the IPHE and it will
emit a report about the IPHE activities every 2 years. Finally,
according to Article 3(3), the Committee will be composed of  up to
two senior-level government representatives appointed by each
partner listed in Appendix A but each partner will have only one
vote. The IEA will sit as observer. See Terms of  Reference, n. 107
above.
115 Ibid., Article 3(6).
116 Membership of  both the Implementation Committee and the
Liaison Committee resemble the Planning Committee.
117 See Terms of  Reference, n. 107 above, Article 3(8).
118 Ibid., Article 3(11). The US Department of  Energy will serve as a
temporary secretariat.
119 Ibid., Article 6.
120 It is quite significant that the Terms of  Reference do not provide
for any non-compliance mechanism or dispute-settling system, but
this is understandable taking into account that the partners are not
legally obliged to follow the IPHE rules.
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HYDROGEN ECONOMY 
AND THE UNITED NATIONS 
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION 
ON CLIMATE CHANGE
Let us then draw the different strands of the argu-
ments presented in this article together. This article
has argued that energy policy is closely and intricately
linked to climate change policy and that an energy
policy solution that has reduced greenhouse gas emis-
sions is thus also a solution to the climate change
problems. Furthermore, unlike climate change, which
is a highly politically charged issue, energy policy is a
top priority of all countries, whether rich or poor, and
is on their national agendas. It has been argued that
an examination of international sustainable develop-
ment resolutions, declarations and plans of action
indicates that there is global agreement that current
patterns of energy production and consumption are
unsustainable, and that there is need to develop new
and renewable forms of energy, taking into account
the precautionary, the environmental impact assess-
ment and the liability principles. Furthermore, such
energy forms need to be developed within multilateral
fora and with multi-stakeholder involvement. 
This article then followed with the argument that,
among the new sources of energy, hydrogen appears
to be particularly promising, especially when it is gen-
erated by using renewable sources of energy. With 25
years of history in energy research and from all the
international initiatives, it would appear that the time
is ripe for pushing hydrogen as a commonly used
source of energy. 
This analysis was followed in the article by a presenta-
tion of evidence of the international community’s
interest in hydrogen, as evinced in international
agreements to advance a hydrogen economy. The docu-
ments analysed include hard law instruments, such
as the IEA Hydrogen Agreement, and soft law instru-
ments, such as the US bilateral agreements and the
IPHE. The trend seems to be to favour soft law instru-
ments over hard law choices. Given that the promo-
tion of a hydrogen economy is a relatively new agenda
item, it is logical that the initial steps will be possibly
taken in soft law instruments; and these soft law
instruments can be seen as a ﬁrst step towards a hard
law instrument in the future. This is in line with the
climate negotiations in 1992, which were preceded by
several soft law instruments, such as the 1988 Toronto
Statement and the 1989 Hague and Noordwijk Declara-
tions, to name a few.121 
The documents also show that it is not only developed
countries who are involved in hydrogen research and
policy, but that, increasingly, via the bilateral agree-
ments and the IPHE, developing countries, including
Brazil, China, India and the Republic of Korea, are
engaged in these discussions. This would imply that
many of the major greenhouse gas emitters are con-
sidering hydrogen as a potential alternative fuel. 
It would perhaps not be out of place here to dwell
brieﬂy on the ambiguous role of the USA. The USA has
been an active researcher in the area of climate change
and was also actively engaged in developing interna-
tional policies on the climate change issue until 1997
when the Kyoto Protocol was adopted. Since 1997, the
USA has been reluctantly participating in the climate
change regime and, in 2001, it withdrew its support
for the protocol because ‘for America, complying with
those mandates would have a negative economic
impact, with layoffs of workers and price increases for
consumers’.122  Then, after shutting the door to the
international community, the Bush Administration
started bilateral negotiations on climate change that
ran parallel to the efforts of other countries in the
Kyoto framework. Meanwhile, the USA maintained in
its climate change policy that it would reduce its
greenhouse gas emissions by 18% in a 10-year period
starting in 2002.123  Within its climate change policy,
the USA wants to foster international cooperation in
hydrogen as part of the cooperation on bilateral cli-
mate agreements. This leads to the following question:
what strategy is the USA following? It is clear that the
USA prefers a bilateral path to a multilateral path. But
if that is the case, why is it then pushing for the IPHE?
One can argue that the US hydrogen research and
development strategy is based on the consolidation of
a multilateral framework, the IPHE, which stands on
previous bilateral agreements. One could go a step fur-
ther and argue that, assuming this is not a red herring
strategy of the USA, the steps taken by the US Govern-
ment indicate that it sees hydrogen as a potentially
strong alternative to other fuels, that the USA is will-
ing to develop this energy source in cooperation with
other countries, and that having made some bilateral
agreements, it is willing to engage in multilateral
agreements on this issue. However, it is not clear if the
121 See Conference Statement of  the Conference on the Changing
Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security (Toronto, 27–30 June
1988); the Declaration of  the Hague, adopted by the Meeting of  the
122 See US State Department, n. 92 above.
123 See US Department of  State Fact Sheet, Office of  the Press
Secretary, US Climate Change Policy (30 September 2003), available
at <http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/fs/2003/25758.htm>: ‘In February
2002, President Bush committed the United States to a comprehens-
ive strategy to reduce the greenhouse gas intensity of  the American
economy (how much we emit per unit of  economic activity) by 18
percent over the next 10 years’.
Heads of State, hosted by the Prime Minister of  the Netherlands (The
Hague, 11 March 1989); and the Noordwijk Declaration on Climate
Change, adopted by the 67 countries attending the Atmospheric
Pollution and Climatic Change Ministerial Conference (Noordwijk,
6–7 November 1989).
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USA would be willing to focus efforts on developing
hydrogen in a sustainable manner, since it has not
made any explicit commitments to that effect. 
Russia, too, as a participant in the IPHE, has indicated
its interest and willingness to engage in discussions on
hydrogen. Although Russia has not ratiﬁed the Energy
Charter,124  the purpose of which is to establish a legal
framework ‘in order to promote long-term coopera-
tion in the energy ﬁeld, based on complementarities
and mutual beneﬁts, in accordance with the objectives
and principles of the Charter’,125  it applies it ‘provi-
sionally’.126  This would indicate that Russia too is
interested in developing this path.
Given that the US is not participating in the Protocol,
it might give the US an elegant re-entry option into
the regime, but on an issue that it and other countries
seem to think is a fruitful area of co-operation. For
Russia, this might be an added reason for going ahead
with the Kyoto Protocol. 
Of course one may be tempted to ask at this point, why
are such initiatives already not visible? One answer
could be that the negotiations are so politically
charged and the role of the oil-exporting countries in
preventing mention of new sources of energy is so
dominant, that the countries involved feel that it
might be more politically expedient to undertake
measures outside the regime. The other explanation
could be that countries are promoting hydrogen out-
side the context of climate change in order to under-
mine the multilateral efforts being undertaken in the
ﬁeld.
Assuming that the latter is an unworthy way of reas-
oning, now that the groundwork has been undertaken
in the IEA Hydrogen Agreement, in the bilateral
agreements and in the IPHE, it is time, possibly, for
the EU to undertake a serious initiative in this ﬁeld.
Such a serious initiative could include drafting a pro-
tocol on hydrogen to the UNFCCC.
The overall goals of such a protocol should be similar
to the previous hydrogen-related instruments and,
therefore, they should focus on the promotion of
hydrogen research and development. Nevertheless,
the UNFCCC Hydrogen Protocol should have two
more speciﬁc goals. On the one hand, it should take
into account that hydrogen is considered to be an opti-
mal solution only if produced from renewable energy
sources. One of the most important UNFCCC goals
should be to achieve, over a period of 10 years, hydro-
gen production mainly from these kinds of energy
sources. On the other hand, the protocol should take
into account that energy is crucial for developing
countries. Their need for energy is urgent in order for
them to develop. Therefore, another requirement of a
hydrogen protocol should be to consider developing
country needs when advancing a hydrogen economy.
The proposed protocol would foster north–south
cooperation and be inclusive of all like-minded coun-
tries. Parties would therefore be divided into active
parties (those from north and south interested in
developing hydrogen as an energy carrier), and pass-
ive parties (other countries), who have the right to be
informed and, if appropriate, to inﬂuence the discus-
sion. The protocol would have a preamble that would
take into account previous hydrogen-related efforts
within the international community, such as the IEA
Hydrogen Agreement and the IPHE. The objectives of
the protocol would be to foster research and develop-
ment, to increase technology cooperation and to
explore the practicalities of switching to hydrogen
within 10–20 years. The protocol’s principles would
reﬂect those present in Article 3 of the UNFCCC.
Active parties to the protocol would have four main
obligations: ﬁrst, to foster hydrogen research and
development; second, to foster technology coopera-
tion; third, to study the feasibility of switching to
hydrogen in a 10–20-year framework; and, ﬁnally, to
present a report every 2 years in which they underline
their efforts in order to fulﬁl the protocol’s goals. In
2010 the parties could gather and decide whether the
timeframe of the obligations has to be modiﬁed. The
protocol does not imply the end of the Kyoto Protocol.
In fact, it would be the opposite: the two protocols
would work together and strengthen each other. The
negotiations of such a protocol, once such a draft
text is prepared, would then be in the hands of the
Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC. Possibly
three committees need to be set up: a committee for
renewable energies; a committee for developing coun-
tries; and an implementation committee. The com-
mittees could provide advice about how the protocol
can be strengthened while the negotiations are tak-
ing place. 
In sum, the UNFCCC Hydrogen Protocol would be an
instrument to address energy concerns where they are
most urgent: in the climate change regime. Such a
protocol should be a multilateral binding legal instru-
ment that takes into account the need to produce
hydrogen from renewable energies and the special
needs of developing countries. These concerns would
be reﬂected both in the goals that the protocol would
set itself and in its institutional structure. 
124 Energy Charter Treaty (The Hague, 17 December 1991).
Although the agreement does not specifically mention hydrogen, it
applies to renewable energy sources and cleaner fuels. Thus, it
does provide a framework for cooperation in the area of  hydrogen.
Although Russia has not yet ratified the agreement, Russia pass-
ively supports this and one may infer that Russia has interests in
developing and promoting clean energy.
125 Ibid., Article 2.
126 According to the official Energy Charter Treaty website, available
at <http://www.encharter.org/index.jsp?psk=0502&ptp=tDetail.
jsp&pci=24&pti=21>.
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CONCLUSIONS
This article has argued that there is a current deadlock
in the climate change negotiations and that one way
out of the deadlock is to seek areas of common interest
between key countries that are not participating in the
regime – such as the USA and Russia – and the key
countries that are participating in the regime – such
as the EU, China, India and Brazil – that can also
contribute to addressing the climate change problem.
International policy documents negotiated over the
last decade indicate that global agreement exists on
the need to develop and promote sustainable energy
sources. Although there is a quarter of a century of
work promoting research on hydrogen within a bind-
ing legal framework, in the last 2 years hydrogen as an
energy carrier has become a prominent alternative
and seems to be one of the most effective options if
it is produced from renewable sources of energy. A
number of bilateral agreements have been initiated by
the USA and an international partnership to promote
hydrogen has been established that includes Russia,
India and China. This article concludes that, since
energy policy and especially policy on hydrogen seems
to be a fruitful option, discussing the possibility of a
hydrogen protocol to the UNFCCC may be a diplomat-
ically elegant option for bringing the USA and Russia
back into the discussions and pushing the regime
incrementally forward. 
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